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In this letter we summarize some recent theoretical work on the design of collectives, i.e., of
systems containing many agents, each of which can be viewed as trying to maximize an associated
private utility, where there is also a world utility rating the behavior of that overall system that
the designer of the collective wishes to optimize. We then apply algorithms based on that work on
a recently suggested testbed for such optimization problems [1]. This is the problem of finding the
combination of imperfect nano-scale objects that results in the best aggregate object. We present
experimental results showing that these algorithms outperform conventional methods by more than
an order of magnitude in this domain.
PACS numbers: 89.20.Ff,89.75.-k , 89.75.Fb
I. MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
The optimization problem of finding the subset of a set
of imperfect devices that results in the best aggregate de-
vice was recently introduced by Challet and Johnson [1].
It is an abstraction of what will likely be a major dif-
ficulty in the construction of systems using nano-scale
components, arising when a large fraction of those com-
ponents may be faulty, so that we cannot use a scheme
fixed ahead of time for interconnecting them. This ab-
straction is a computationally hard optimization prob-
lem; brute force approaches cannot be used for large in-
stances of it. It is also particularly well-suited to testing
distributed optimization algorithms.
We propose addressing this problem by associating
each device with an adaptive reinforcement-learning (RL)
agent [5]) that decides whether or not its device will be
a member of the subset. It makes this decision based
on its estimate of which choice will give a larger value
of its associated private utility function which maps
the joint choice of all agents into the reals. For such an
approach to work, we must both ensure that the agents
do not work at cross-purposes, and that each one has
a tractable learning problem to solve. Typically these
two desiderata conflict with one another (utilities that
account for whether your action is at cross-purposes to
any other agents’ actions are very complex and therefore
difficult to optimize). So we must find the best way to
trade them off each other.
A collective is any such system containing utility-
maximizing agents, together with an overall world util-
ity function that rates the possible configurations of
the overall system. The associated design problem is
how to configure the collective — and in particular how
to set the private utility functions — to best optimize
the world utility. This design problem is related to
work in many other fields, including multi-agent systems
(MAS’s), computational economics, mechanism design,
reinforcement learning, statistical mechanics, computa-
tional ecologies, (partially observable) Markov decision
processes and game theory. However none of these fields
is both applicable in large problems, and directly ad-
dresses the general design problem, rather than a spe-
cial instance of it. (See [9] for a detailed discussion of
the relationship between these fields, involving hundreds
of references.) In particular, since detailed modeling of
extremely large real-world systems is usually impossi-
ble, it is crucial to use design algorithms that tdo not
employ such modeling. We need to make our design
leveraging only the simple assumption that the agents’
learning algorithms are individually reasonably behaved.
Recently some advances have been made in doing just
that [6, 9, 11]. It is those advances that we propose to
apply to the problem of Challet and Johnson.
II. THE MATHEMATICS OF DESIGNING
COLLECTIVES
Let ζ be an arbitrary space whose elements z give the
joint move of all agents in the collective system. We wish
to search for the z that maximizes the provided world
utility G(z). In addition to G we are concerned with
private utility functions {gη}, one such function for each
agent η controlling zη. We use the notationˆη to refer to
all agents other than η.
Our uncertainty concerning the state of the system is
reflected in a probability distribution over ζ. Our abil-
ity to control the system consists of setting the value of
some characteristic of the collective, e.g., setting the pri-
vate utility functions of the agents. Indicating that value
of the global coordinate by s, our analysis revolves
around the following central equation for P (G | s),
which follows from Bayes’ theorem:
P (G | s) = (1)∫
d ~NGP (G | ~NG, s)
∫
d ~NgP ( ~NG | ~Ng, s)P ( ~Ng | s) ,
where ~Ng and ~NG are the intelligence vectors of the
agents with respect to gη and G, respectively. Intelli-
gence, defined as the “standardization” of utility func-
2tions so that the numeric value they assign to a z only
reflects their ranking of z relative to certain other ele-
ments of ζ, is given by:
Nη,U (z) ≡
∫
dµzˆη (z
′)Θ[U(z)− U(z′)] , (2)
where Θ is the Heaviside function, and where the sub-
script on the (normalized) measure dµ indicates it is re-
stricted to z′ sharing the same non-η components as z.
Note that Nη,gη (z) = 1 means that agent η is fully ra-
tional at z, in that its move maximizes the value of its
utility, given the moves of the agents. In other words,
a point z where Nη,gη(z) = 1 for all agents η is one
that meets the definition of a game-theory Nash equi-
librium. On the other hand, a z at which all components
of ~NG = 1 is a maximum G along all coordinates of z
(which of course does not mean it is a maximum along
an off-axis direction). So if we can get these two points
to be identical, then if the agents do well enough at max-
imizing their private utilities we are assured we will be
near an axis-maximizing point for G.
To formalize this, consider our decomposition of P (G |
s). If we can choose s so that the third conditional prob-
ability in the integrand is peaked around vectors ~Ng all
of whose components are close to 1, then we have likely
induced large (private utility function) intelligences. In-
tuitively, this ensures that the private utility functions
have high “signal-to-noise”. If we can also have the sec-
ond term be peaked about ~NG equal to ~Ng, then ~NG will
also be large. It is in the second term that the require-
ment that the private utility functions be “aligned with
G” arises. Note that our desired form for the second term
in Equation 2 is assured if we have chosen private utilities
such that ~Ng equals ~NG exactly for all z. Such a system
is said to be factored. Finally, if the first term in the
integrand is peaked about high G when ~NG is large, then
our choice of s will likely result in high G, as desired. In
this letter we concentrate on the second and third terms,
and show how to simultaneously set them to have the
desired form.
As an example, any “team game” in which all private
utility functions equal G is factored [2]. However team
games often have very poor forms for term 3 in Equa-
tion 2, forms which get progressively worse as the size
of the collective grows. This is because for such private
utility functions each agent η will usually confront a very
poor “signal-to-noise” ratio in trying to discern how its
actions affect its utility gη = G, since so many other
agent’s actions also affect G and therefore dilute η’s ef-
fect on its own private utility function.
We now focus on algorithms based on private utility
functions {gη} that optimize the signal/noise ratio re-
flected in the third term, subject to the requirement that
the system be factored. To understand how these algo-
rithms work, say we are given an arbitrary function f(zη)
over agent η’s moves, two such moves zη
1 and zη
2, a util-
ity U , a value s of the global coordinate, and a move
by all agents other than η, zˆη. Define the associated
learnability by
Λf (U ; zˆη, s, zη
1, zη
2) ≡ (3)√
[E(U ; zˆη, zη1)− E(U ; zˆη, zη2)]2∫
dzη[f(zη)V ar(U ; zˆη, zη)]
.
The expectation values in the numerator are formed by
averaging over the training set of the learning algorithm
used by agent η, nη. Those two averages are evaluated
according to the two distributions P (U |nη)P (nη|zˆη, zη
1)
and P (U |nη)P (nη|zˆη, zη
2), respectively. (That is the
meaning of the semicolon notation.) Similarly the vari-
ance being averaged in the denominator is over nη ac-
cording to the distribution P (U |nη)P (nη|zˆη, zη).
The denominator in Equation 4 reflects how sensitive
U(z) is to changing zˆη. In contrast, the numerator re-
flects how sensitive U(z) is to changing zη. So the greater
the learnability of a private utility function gη, the more
gη(z) depends only on the move of agent η, i.e., the bet-
ter the associated signal-to-noise ratio for η. Intuitively
then, so long as it does not come at the expense of de-
creasing the signal, increasing the signal-to-noise ratio
specified in the learnability will make it easier for η to
achieve a large value of its intelligence. This can be estab-
lished formally: if appropriately scaled, g′η will result in
better expected intelligence for agent η than will gη when-
ever Λf(g
′
η; zˆη, s, zη
1, zη
2) > Λf (gη; zˆη, s, zη
1, zη
2) for
all pairs of moves zη
1, zη
2[8].
One can solve for the set of all private utilities that
are factored with respect to a particular world utility.
Unfortunately though, in general a collective cannot both
be factored and have infinite learnability for all of its
agents [8]. However consider difference utilities, of the
form
U(z) = β[G(z)−D(zˆη)] (4)
Any difference utility is factored [8]. In addition, for all
pairs zη
1, zη
2, under benign approximations the differ-
ence utility maximizing Λf (U ; zˆη, s, zη
1, zη
2) by
D(zˆη) = Ef (G(z) | zˆη, s) , (5)
up to an overall additive constant, where the expectation
value is over zη. We call the resultant difference utility
the Aristocrat utility (AU), loosely reflecting the fact
that it measures the difference between a agent’s actual
action and the average action. If each agent η uses an
appropriately rescaled version of the associated AU as its
private utility function, then we have ensured good form
for both terms 2 and 3 in Equation 2.
Using AU in practice is sometimes difficult, due to
the need to evaluate the expectation value. Fortunately
there are other utility functions that, while being easier
to evaluate than AU , still are both factored and possess
superior learnability to the team game utility, gη = G.
One such private utility function is the Wonderful Life
3Utility (WLU). The WLU for agent η is parameterized
by a pre-fixed clamping parameter CLη chosen from
among η’s possible moves:
WLUη ≡ G(z)−G(zˆη, CLη) . (6)
WLU is factored no matter what the choice of clamping
parameter. Furthermore, while not matching the high
learnability of AU , WLU usually has far better learn-
ability than does a team game, and therefore (when ap-
propriately scaled) results in better expected intelligence
[6, 9, 11].
III. COMBINATION OF IMPERFECT OBJECTS
We now explore the use of collective-based techniques
for the problem of combining imperfect objects of Chal-
let and Johnson. The canonical version of this problem
arises when the objects are all noisy observational devices
producing a single real number by sampling a Gaussian
of fixed width centered on the true value of the number.
The problem is to choose the subset of a fixed collection
of such devices to have the average (over the members of
the subset) distortion as close to zero as possible.
Formally, the problem is to minimize
ǫ ≡
|
∑m
j=1 njaj |∑m
k=1 nk
,
where nj ∈ {0, 1} is whether device j is or is not se-
lected, and there are m devices in the collection, having
associated distortions {aj}. We identify ǫ with the world
utility, G (so that for these experiments, the goal is to
minimize G, not maximize it). There are m individual
agents, each setting one of the nj . The goal is to give
those agents private utilities so that, as they learn to
maximize their private utilities, the maximizer of G is
found.
Because we wished to concentrate on the effects of the
utilities rather than on the RL algorithms that use them,
the agents all used the same (very) simple RL algorithm.
(We would expect that even marginally more sophisti-
cated RL algorithms would give better performance.) At
each timestep each agent runs its algorithm on a data
set it maintains of action-utility pairs to choose what ac-
tion to take. This gives a joint action, which in turn sets
the private utility value for each agent. Combined with
what action it took at that timestep, that utility value
for agent j then gets added to the data set maintained by
agent j. This is done for all agents and then the process
repeats.
The agents used their data sets to choose moves by
maintaining a 2-dimensional vector whose components
at a given timestep are the agent’s estimates of the util-
ity it would receive for taking each of its two possible
move. Each agent j picks its action at a timestep by
sampling a Boltzmann distribution whose over the “en-
ergy spectrum” of j’s two utility estimates at that time.
For simplicity, given how short our runs were, the tem-
perature in the Boltzmann distribution did not decay in
time. However to reflect the fact that the environment
in which an agent is operating changes with time (as the
other agents change their moves), and therefore the op-
timal action changes in time, the two utility estimates
are formed using exponentially aged data: for any time
step t, the utility estimate j uses for setting either of the
two actions nj is a weighted average of all the utility val-
ues it has received at previous times t′ that it chose that
action, with the weights in the average given by an ex-
ponential of the values t− t′. Finally, to form the agents’
initial data sets, there is an initialization period in which
all actions by all agents are chosen uniformly randomly,
with no learning used. It is after this initialization pe-
riod ends that the agents choose their actions according
to the associated Boltzmann distributions.
For all learning algorithms, the first 20 time steps con-
stitute the data set initialization period (note that all
learning algorithms must “perform” the same during that
period, since none are actually in use then). Starting at
t = 20, with each consecutive timestep a fixed fraction
of the agents still choosing their actions randomly switch
to using their learner algorithms instead, while others
continue to take random actions. This gradual introduc-
tion of the learning algorithms is intended to soften the
“discontinuity” in each agent’s environment when the be-
havior of the other agents start using their learning algo-
rithms and therefore change their moves. For m = 100,
four agents turned on their learning algorithms at each
time step (i.e., by t = 26, all agents were using their
learners).
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FIG. 1: Combination of Imperfect Objects Problem, m = 100.
Figure 1 shows the convergence properties of different
algorithms in a system with 100 agents. The results re-
ported are based on 20 different {aj} configurations, each
performed 50 times (i.e., each point on the figure is the
average of 20×50 = 1000 runs). G, AU , andWLU show
the performance of agents using reinforcement learners
with those reinforcement signals provided by G (team
game), Aristocrat Utility and Wonderful Life Utility re-
4spectively. S shows the performance of greedy search
where new nj ’s are generated at each step and selected
if the solution is better than the current best solution.
Because the runs are only 200 timesteps long, algorithms
such as simulated annealing do not outperform simple
search: there is simply no time for an annealing sched-
ule.
Note that because of the discontinuity in the environ-
ment experienced by each agent as the other agents turn
on their learning algorithms, the performance of the sys-
tem as a whole as the agents turn on their learning may
degrade initially, before settling down (e.g., WLU). Qual-
itatively, systems in which agents use the G utility have a
difficult time learning, while systems in which agents use
AU perform best and the search algorithm falls between
the performance of the two.
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FIG. 2: Scaling in the Combination of Imperfect Objects
Problem.
We also investigated the scaling properties of each algo-
rithm. Figure 2 shows these results (the t = 200 average
performance over 1000 runs) along with the associated
error bars. As m grows two competing factors come into
play. On the one hand, there are more degrees of freedom
to use to minimize G. On the other hand, the problem
becomes more difficult: the search space gets larger for
S, and there is more noise in the system for the learning
algorithms. To account for these effects and calibrate the
performance values as m varies, in the figure we also pro-
vide the performance of the algorithm that randomly se-
lects its action (“Ran”). Note that the difference between
the performances of S and AU increases when the system
size increases, up to a factor of twenty for m = 1000.
All algorithms but AU have slopes similar to that of
“Ran”, demonstrating that they cannot use the addi-
tional degrees of freedom provided by the largerm. Only
AU effectively uses the new degrees of freedom, provid-
ing gains that are proportionally higher than the other
algorithms (i.e., the rate at which AU ’s performance im-
proves outpaces what is “expected” based on the random
algorithm’s performance).
Finally, note that many search algorithms (e.g., gradi-
ent ascent, simulated annealing, genetic algorithms) can
be viewed as collectives. However conventionally such
algorithms use very “dumb” agents. In particular, in
exploration-exploitation algorithms, the agents typically
make random moves in the exploration step rather than
RL to choose the best move. Preliminary results indicate
that using RL-based agents to determine the moves in
such exploration steps — intuitively, “agentizing” the in-
dividual variables of a search problem by providing them
with adaptive intelligence — can lead to significantly bet-
ter solutions than are achieved with conventional “dumb
variable” exploration steps in a myriad of optimization
problems [10].
[1] D. Challet and N. F. Johnson. Optimal combinations of
imperfect objects. Physical Review Letters, 89:028701,
2002.
[2] R. H. Crites and A. G. Barto. Improving elevator perfor-
mance using reinforcement learning. In D. S. Touretzky,
M. C. Mozer, and M. E. Hasselmo, editors, Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems - 8, pages 1017–
1023. MIT Press, 1996.
[3] B. A. Huberman and T. Hogg. The behavior of compu-
tational ecologies. In The Ecology of Computation, pages
77–115. North-Holland, 1988.
[4] N. F. Johnson, S. Jarvis, R. Jonson, P. Cheung, Y. R.
Kwong, and P. M. Hui. Volatility and agent adaptability
in a self-organizing market. preprint cond-mat/9802177,
February 1998.
[5] R. S. Sutton and A. G. Barto. Reinforcement Learning:
An Introduction. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998.
[6] K. Tumer and D. H. Wolpert. Collective intelligence and
Braess’ paradox. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth Na-
tional Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 104–
109, Austin, TX, 2000.
[7] C. Watkins and P. Dayan. Q-learning. Machine Learning,
8(3/4):279–292, 1992.
[8] D. H. Wolpert. Theory of design of collectives. pre-print,
2003.
[9] D. H. Wolpert and K. Tumer. Optimal payoff functions
for members of collectives. Advances in Complex Sys-
tems, 4(2/3):265–279, 2001.
[10] D. H. Wolpert, K. Tumer, and E. Bandari. Improving
search algorithms by using intelligent coordinates. 2003.
submitted.
[11] D. H. Wolpert, K. Tumer, and J. Frank. Using collective
intelligence to route internet traffic. In Advances in Neu-
ral Information Processing Systems - 11, pages 952–958.
MIT Press, 1999.
[12] Y. C. Zhang. Modeling market mechanism with evolu-
tionary games. Europhysics Letters, March/April 1998.
